Georgia Law Review
Volume 52

Number 2

Article 5

2018

How to Fill a Procedural Loophole: Re-Evaluating the Ragan and
Walker Analysis in Light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)
Holly M. Boggs
University of Georgia Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Conflict of Laws Commons

Recommended Citation
Boggs, Holly M. (2018) "How to Fill a Procedural Loophole: Re-Evaluating the Ragan and Walker Analysis
in Light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)," Georgia Law Review: Vol. 52: No. 2, Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of
Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please
contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Boggs: How to Fill a Procedural Loophole: Re-Evaluating the Ragan and Wa

NOTES
HOW TO FILL A PROCEDURAL LOOPHOLE:
RE-EVALUATING THE RAGAN AND WALKER
ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(M)
Holly MarthaBoggs*
Legislatures implement statutes of limitations to
protect defendants from being brought into lawsuits for
incidents long past. However, a proceduralloophole in
the Georgiafederal court system could permit plaintiffs
to disregardstatutes of limitations and wait as long as
they please to notify a defendant of a pending claim.
The loophole exists because federal courts in Georgia
must defer to state law governing the tolling of statutes
of limitations, and that state law is procedurally
incompatible with the federal court's system. In order
to fill the procedural loophole, this Note argues that the
Eleventh Circuit should apply the federal rule-rather
than Georgia's state law-governing the amount of
time a plaintiff can wait before perfecting service of
process upon a defendant. Specifically, the court
should re-evaluate its prior decision to apply the
state-rather than federal-timely service rule in
Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company v.
Claxton in light of a subsequently-enactedFederalRule
of Civil Procedure:Rule 4(m). Rule 4(m) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure directly collides with Georgia's
timely service law and, therefore, under the Erie
Railroad Company v. Tompkins doctrine, courts should
defer to the federal rather than state rule. Moreover, if
federal courts continue to apply Georgia's timely service
J.D. Candidate, University of Georgia School of Law, 2018. The author thanks Professor
David Shipley for valuable input in the development of this Note.
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law, the procedural loophole will persist, permitting
plaintiffs to disregard statutes of limitations and
incentivizing parties to bring claims in federal court.
This violates the twin aims of Erie. Finally, Georgia's
timely service law is not bound-up in state substantive
rights, and its application would interfere with an
essential function of the federal system. Therefore, the
federal rule-rather than the Georgia rule-should
apply.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Statutes of limitations serve an important role in the American
judicial system. For example, assume a car crash occurs between
Barbara and Alex in 2017. They exchange insurance information
and settle their debts. Barbara moves on with her life, assuming
the issue has been put to rest. In the next twenty years, Barbara
takes out loans to open a small business, mortgages her house, and
bears three children. Though her business is successful, money is
tight trying to repay the loans, finance the mortgage, and raise her
family. Then one day in 2037, while Barbara is at work, a process
server approaches her and serves her a complaint Alex has filed
against her regarding their 2017 car accident. It alleges that
Barbara negligently ran a red light twenty years ago, which
caused the crash, and it seeks compensation for all the injuries
Alex sustained from the crash.
Now, on top of all her existing expenses, Barbara must pay to
litigate the case and could be required to pay crushing monetary
damages if the court finds she was negligent. If Barbara cannot
juggle all these expenses, she risks losing her business, house, and
ability to provide for her family. If Barbara had known she would
face this liability earlier, she could have saved money and been
more cautious in taking on too much debt. But she had no reason
to expect that this lawsuit would commence twenty years after the
accident occurred.
Even more, Barbara believes she never ran the red light and
She reaches out to on-scene
the accident was Alex's fault.
witnesses to help support this defense, but they either cannot
remember what happened twenty years ago or have since died.
Though there was a stoplight camera at the intersection that could
have corroborated Barbara's story, it has since been taped over.
Because of this, there is no longer any way for Barbara to craft a
defense, thereby increasing the likelihood that she will have to pay
damages for actions she never took.
Over the twenty-year period, the odds of a jury wrongly finding
Barbara guilty and the odds of Barbara losing everything she has
worked for have exponentially increased with time. Barbara's
situation is exactly what legislatures try to avoid by enacting
statutes of limitations. These statutes have been a staple of
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American jurisprudence for centuries, 1 and courts use them to
ensure defendants like Barbara receive fair notice of adverse
claims. 2 Specifically, they allow defendants like Barbara to live
their lives without the fear of lingering claims arising out of
actions "long past" by setting an end date to potential litigation,
and they limit the opportunity for plaintiffs like Alex to commence
fraudulent or harassing suits against a defendant. 3 Receiving fair
notice of an adverse claim also ensures a defendant is able to
preserve relevant evidence that could be used to craft a defense. 4
Though statutes of limitations serve this important role in the
American judicial system, a Georgia Court of Appeals decision,
Giles v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company,5 leaves them
vulnerable to attack. This ruling has inadvertently rendered
statutes of limitations theoretically inapplicable to plaintiffs filing
suit in Georgia federal courts under diversity jurisdiction.
The source of the problem is an incompatibility between
Georgia state and ,federal court procedures regarding service of
process. 6 Under the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Cambridge
Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. City of Claxton, Georgia
federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction are required to apply
an incompatible Georgia service of process law to determine how
long an individual has to perfect service of process after a suit's
statute of limitations has passed. 7 The requirement that Georgia
1 See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (noting that statutes of limitations
were adopted in most American colonies before the Revolution); Developments in the Law:
Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (1950) (noting that the Limitation Act
of 1623 marks the beginning of modern law of limitations); Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes
of Limitations:A Policy Analysis in the Context of ReparationsLitigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 68, 73 (2005) (noting that statutes of limitations have been around for centuries).
2 See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1983) (explaining that
limitations periods are intended to put defendants on notice of advance claims); Burnett v.
N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (explaining that statutes of limitations are used
"to assure fairness to defendants').
3 See Malveaux, supra note 1, at 75-76 (explaining that statutes of limitations provide
repose to defendants "by preventing surprises through the revival of claims" (quoting Order
of R.R. Telegraphs v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944))).
4 Id. at 76 (explaining that statutes of limitations are designed to "enhance the accuracy
of evidence" and provide a defendant "sufficient notice to properly defend himself').
6 765 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
6 See discussion infra Part H.
I Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Claxton, 720 F.2d 1230, 1233 (11th Cir. 1983)
(looking to Georgia law to determine whether the state's statute of limitations bars plaintiffs'
action).
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federal courts apply this incompatible rule has now created a
procedural loophole that plaintiffs can use to circumvent a given
8
statute of limitations.
To fill this procedural loophole, this Note will argue that
Cambridge, as well as the Supreme Court cases on which its
decision was premised, should be re-analyzed in light of a
subsequently-enacted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing
how long an individual has to perfect service of process.9 It will
further argue that Georgia federal courts should now apply the
compatible Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
rather than the incompatible state rule, to determine whether
service has been timely perfected after a statute of limitations
period has passed. Part II of this Note describes Georgia's
procedural loophole. Part III provides background on the Erie
doctrine and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cambridge. Part
IV evaluates why Cambridge should be re-analyzed and why,
under this new analysis, the courts should apply Rule 4(m) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than Georgia's timely
service requirement in these circumstances. Part V concludes that
now is the time for the Eleventh Circuit to act in order to preserve
the integrity of statutes of limitations.

II. GEORGIA'S PROCEDURAL LOOPHOLE
Generally, for a plaintiff to avoid a statute of limitations
extinguishing his claim, he must commence a suit on the claim in
a way that tolls the statute of limitations. 10 For a statute of
limitations to be tolled in Georgia federal diversity cases, a
complaint must be filed prior to the date set by the statute of
limitations, and it must be followed by "timely service perfected as
authorized by law."1 As previously discussed, Cambridge requires
See discussion infraPart II.
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
10 See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531 (1949)
(analyzing whether an individual was barred from bringing a claim because, though he had
filed a claim, he had not taken the subsequent steps necessary to toll the statute of
limitations).
11 Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kilgore, 462 S.E.2d 713, 714 (Ga. 1995) ('If the
timely filing of [a complaint] is followed by timely service perfected as authorized by law,
the subsequent service will relate back to the initial filing even though the statute of
limitations has run in the interim." (citing Hilton v. Maddox, Bishop, Hayton Frame & Trim
8
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that federal courts in diversity cases look to a Georgia, rather than
federal, rule to determine whether the service was timely perfected
in these circumstances. 12 This state rule is found in section 9-114(c) of the Georgia Code, which provides that "the person making
such service shall make the service within five days from the time
of receiving the summons and complaint. . . ."13 If a plaintiff fails
to complete service within this five-day grace period, the plaintiff
must demonstrate he exercised due diligence in perfecting service
in order for it to relate back to the date of filing the complaint.1 4
Therefore, to toll a statute of limitations in Georgia federal
diversity cases, a plaintiff must file his complaint prior to the date
Contractors, Inc., 188 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972))). In federal diversity jurisdiction
cases, it is the Georgia rule-not the federal rule-that determines whether an action tolls a
statute of limitations. See Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Claxton, 720 F.2d 1230,
1233 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Georgia law determines whether plaintiffs are barred by the statute
of limitations."). Merely filing a complaint does not satisfy Georgia commencement rules.
See Chance v. Planters Rural Tel. Coop., Inc., 131 S.E.2d 541, 544 (Ga. 1963) ("[The mere
filing of the petition will not of itself operate to toll the statute of limitation. For, service is
also a vital ingredient."). The court has made the tolling of a statute of limitations
contingent on service of process because "[t]he defendant has no legal notice of the suit until
served with a copy of the petition and process." Hilton, 188 S.E.2d at 169 (quoting Jordan v.
Bosworth, 51 S.E. 755, 756 (Ga. 1905)).
12 See Cambridge, 720 F.2d at 1233 (noting Georgia's timely service rule should govern
when determining "whether plaintiffs are barred by the statute of limitations").
13 See id. ('If service is perfected within five days of filing the complaint, even though the
statute of limitations has run before service is perfected, service will still relate back."); see
also McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 177 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing
Cambridge for interpretation of the rule), vacated on other grounds, McAndrew v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 183 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 1999); Morris v. Haren, 52 F.3d 947, 949 (11th Cir.
1995) (same); Roberts v. Jones, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334 (M.D. Ga. 2005) (calculating the
five days from the date the statute of limitations expires); Johnson v. Am. Meter Co., 412 F.
Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (quoting the interpretation of the rule in Cambridge);
Lau v. Klinger, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (S.D. Ga. 1999) (same); In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Brunswick, 158 F.R.D. 693, 699 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (same); Patty v. Toyota Motor Corp., 777 F.
Supp. 956, 959 (N.D. Ga. 1991) ("[I]f service is perfected within five days of filing the
compliant, even though the statute of limitations has run before service is perfected, service
will relate back."); Giles v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 765 Ga. App. 314, 319 n.2 (2014)
(listing approximately sixty cases that calculate the five-day grace period from the time the
plaintiff files the complaint).
14 See Cantin v. Justice, 480 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) ("Where a complaint is filed
near the statute of limitation and service is made after the statute expires and after the fiveday safe harbor provision contained within [O.C.G.A.] § 9-11-4(c), the relation back of the
service to the date of filing is dependent upon the diligence exercised by the plaintiff in
perfecting service... . The plaintiff has the burden of showing that due diligence was
exercised."' (quoting Mann v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 452 S.E.2d 130, 132 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994),
overruled on other grounds by Giles v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 756 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. Ct. App.
2014))).
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set by the statute of limitations and then subsequently perfect
service of process within the five-day grace period or he has the
burden of demonstrating he exercised due diligence in perfecting
service.
For thirty-six years, many Georgia state and all Georgia federal
courts interpreted this five-day grace period to begin either once
the plaintiff filed his claim in court or once the statute of
limitations ended. 15 Then in 2014, a Georgia Court of Appeals
case, Giles v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, rejected this
calculation of the five-day grace period and overruled all Georgia
16 The court in
cases that calculate the grace period in this way.
15 See Cambridge, 720 F.2d at 1233 (11th Cir. 1983) ("If service is perfected within five
days of filing the complaint, even though the statute of limitations has run before service is
perfected, service will still relate back.'); see also McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 177
F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Cambridge for interpretation of the rule), vacated
on other grounds, McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 183 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 1999);
Morris v. Haren, 52 F.3d 947, 949 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); Roberts v. Jones, 390 F. Supp. 2d
1333, 1334 (M.D. Ga. 2005) (calculating the five days from the date the statute of
limitations expires); Johnson v. Am. Meter Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
(quoting the interpretation of the rule in Cambridge); Lau v. Klinger, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1377
(S.D. Ga. 1999) (same); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Brunswick, 158 F.R.D. 693, 699 (N.D.
Ga. 1994) (same); Patty v. Toyota Motor Corp., 777 F. Supp. 956, 959 (N.D. Ga. 1991) ("[I]f
service is perfected within five days of filing the complaint, even though the statute of
limitations has run before service is perfected, service will relate back."); Giles v. State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 765 Ga. App. 314, 319 n.2 (2014) (listing approximately sixty cases that
calculate the five-day grace period from the time the plaintiff files the complaint). The
court in Giles noted the origin of this calculation was a 1978 case, Bible v. Hughes, which
paraphrased the rule as: "Where the statute of limitation accrues between the date of filing
and the date of service, whether or not it relates back (if the service is more than five days
after the filing) depends on the length of time and the diligence used by the plaintiff." Giles,
765 S.E.2d at 417 (quoting Bible v. Hughes, 247 S.E.2d 584, 585 (Ga. App. 1978)).
16 See Giles, 765 S.E.2d at 419 (overruling all cases that misstate the calculation of the
five-day grace period). In reaching this conclusion, the court in Giles analyzed O.C.G.A. § 911-4(c)'s language, which states: "the person making such service shall make the service
within five days from the time of receiving the summons and complaint." O.C.G.A. § 9-114(c) (2017). The court rejected the trial court's assessment that "'the person making such
service' refers to the party filing the action-not the person or entity who performs the
physical act of serving the pleadings on a plaintiffs behalf." Giles, 765 S.E.2d at 416. The
court held that "the person making such service" under the statute "should not, as a matter
of law, be deemed to be the party filing the action." Id. It noted that
[w]hile in many cases the calculation may, as a matter of fact, run from the
date the complaint was filed (because the person making service received
the summons and complaint on the same day) or run from expiration of the
statute of limitation (because the complaint was filed on the last day of the
limitation period and the complaint and summons was received by the
person making service on the same day), to the extent these cases misstate
the proper rule to be applied generally, they must be overruled.
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Giles ruled that the five-day grace period begins when the service
processor receives the summons and complaint to deliver to the
defendant, not when the plaintiff files the complaint. 17 The court
then stated "if service is made within the five-day grace period
allowed by [O.C.G.A.] § 9-11-4(c), it relates back to the date the
complaint was filed as a matter of law."18 Therefore, according to
the court in Giles, if a service processor perfects service within five
days of receiving the summons and complaint, the service will
relate back to the date the complaint was filed as a matter of law. 19
The Giles rule comports with the Georgia state courts'
procedural scheme for perfecting service of process. Under the
state court scheme, every single individual with a role in the
service has a statutory duty to diligently perfect service upon the
defendant. First, the clerk has the statutory responsibility under
sections § 9-11-4(a) and 9-10-72 of the Georgia Code to issue the
necessary copies of the summons and complaint directly to the
service processor after a plaintiff files the complaint in court. 20
From there, the service processor has the statutory responsibility
of perfecting service within five days of receiving the summons and
Id. at 419.
17 2 CHARLES ADAMS III & CYNTHIA T. ADAMS, GA. PLEADING, PRACTICE, AND FORMS § 911-4, commentary (2016) ('Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c), the defendant must be served with
the summons and complaint within five days from the date the person making service
receives those documents.").
18 Giles, 765 S.E.2d at 417 (emphasis added).
19The court's decision in Giles was subsequently accepted by the Georgia Court of
Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, Georgia district courts, and various secondary sources. See, e.g.,
Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2015) ("[The] five-day safe-harbor
provision applies by its language to process servers only and not to parties .. ");Allen v.
W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., No. CV 214-140, 2015 WL 1931390, at *3 (S.D. Ga. 2015) ("For
the purposes of this statute, 'the person making such service' refers to the process server,
not the party filing the complaint.'); Harrison v. McAfee, 788 S.E.2d 872, 878 (Ga. Ct. App.
2016) (noting that Giles overruled "36 years of erroneous calculation of statutory grace
period for perfecting service'); ADAMS & ADAMS, supra note 17 ("Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c),
the defendant must be served with the summons and complaint within five days from the
date the person making service receives those documents.").
20 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(a) (2017) ("Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk shall forthwith
issue a summons and deliver it for service." (emphasis added)); O.C.G.A. § 9-10-72 (2017) ("If
the defendant or any of the defendants reside outside the county where the action is filed,
the clerk shall issue a second original and copy for such other county or counties and
forward the same to the sheriff, who shall serve the copy .... (emphasis added)); see
Scoggins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 S.E.2d 775, 777 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) ("[The
pertinent process statutes place sole responsibility on the clerk to issue the necessary copies
of the complaint and summons to the sheriff or marshal to accomplish service.").
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complaint from the clerk of court under Giles and section 9-114(c). 21 If the service is not perfected within the five-day grace
period, the plaintiff has a duty to diligently ensure service is
perfected in order for the service to relate back to the date of
filing. 22 A plaintiffs duty of diligence, however, does not arise
under Georgia law unless the service processor fails to perfect
23
service within five days.
The procedural scheme for service of process in federal court
differs from the one in the Georgia state court in such a way that
renders the Giles rule incompatible with the federal court
procedure. When all rules of the federal procedural scheme
govern, every individual with a role in the service has a duty to
timely perfect it. In federal court, rather than the clerk issuing
the summons and complaint to the service processor, the court has
the duty to issue it directly to the plaintiff in accordance with Rule
4(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 24 Then, the plaintiff
has the duty under Rule 4(c)(1) to furnish copies of the summons
and complaint to the service processor. 25 Under Rule 4(m) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is not applied in Georgia
diversity cases due to the ruling in Cambridge, the plaintiff also
has the duty to have the summons and complaint served within
ninety days of filing the complaint. 26
When Georgia federal courts are forced to apply Georgia's
timely service rule, the clerk of court still has the duty under Rule
4(b) to issue a summons and complaint to the plaintiff, but then
the plaintiffs duty to diligently perfect service under section 9-114(c) does not arise until the service processor fails to perfect service
See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
See Cantin v. Justice, 480 S.E.2d 250, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) ("Where a complaint is
filed near the statute of limitation and service is made after the statute expires and after
the five-day safe harbor provision contained within [O.C.G.A.] § 9-11-4(c), the relation back
of the service to the date of filing is dependent upon the diligence exercised by the plaintiff
in perfecting service.").
23 Giles, 765 S.E.2d at 317-18.
2A See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(b) ("If the summons is properly completed, the clerk must sign,
seal and issue it to the plaintiff for service on the defendant." (emphasis added)).
25 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1) ("The plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and
complaint served within the time allowed by Rule 4(m) and must furnish the necessary
copies to the person who makes service.').
26 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) ("If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the
complaint is filed, the court... must dismiss the action without prejudice.., or order that
service be made within a specified time.").
21
22
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within five days of receiving the summons and complaint. Since
the plaintiff is the one who issues the summons and complaint to
the service processor under the federal rules, though, the plaintiff
has full control of when his duty of diligence commences.
This means that a plaintiff in a diversity action in Georgia
federal court can file a complaint within the applicable statute of
limitations and, in theory, wait an endless amount of time before
delivering the summons and complaint to a service processor who
would then have five days to perfect service. Therefore, in the
initial example, even if Alex's claim against Barbara expires in
2018 under Georgia's statute of limitations, he could use this
loophole to wait until 2037 to provide her notice of the action, as
long as he initially files his complaint before 2018 and his service
processor perfects service within five days of receiving the
summons and complaint from him in 2037. This theoretically
allows plaintiffs to take advantage of the procedural loophole and
circumvent Georgia statutes of limitations by simply filing their
cases in federal court under diversity jurisdiction.
III. THE ERIE DOCTRINE AND CAMBRIDGE
To determine whether state or federal rules govern in a federal
diversity case, courts look to the doctrine stemming from the
Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 27 This
is the body of law that informed the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Cambridge to apply the Georgia-rather than the federal-timely
service rule. 28 This section will elaborate on the Erie doctrine
generally and then discuss the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Cambridge.
A. THE ERIE DOCTRINE

The Erie doctrine, in its most basic form, establishes that
federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law

27 304 U.S. 64 (1937); see Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)
(applying Erie and its progeny to determine whether state or federal rules applied in a
federal court diversity action).
28 See generally Cambridge Mut. Ins. Co. v. City of Claxton, 720 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1983).
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and federal procedural law. 29 The underlying principle for the
Erie rule is that "[i]f recovery could not be had in the state court, it
should be denied in the federal court. Otherwise, those authorized
to invoke the diversity jurisdiction would gain advantages over
30
those confined to state courts."
1. Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York. In 1945 in
Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York, the Supreme Court
decided "whether, when no recovery could be had in a State court
because the action is barred by the statute of limitations, a federal
court... can take cognizance of the suit because there is diversity
[jurisdiction] ."31 The Supreme Court held that the state statute of
limitations should be applied in these cases, reasoning that the
intent of the Court's decision in Erie
was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is
exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of
citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation
in federal court should be substantially the same, so
far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation,
32
as it would be if tried in a State court.
The Court further stated that
the question is not whether a statute of limitations is
deemed a matter of 'procedure' in some sense. The
question is ...does it significantly affect the result of
a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a
State that would be controlling in an action upon the
33
same claim by the same parties in a State court?
It held that

See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.'); Tillman v.
Georgia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1314 (S.D. Ga. 2006) ("[A]s an oversimplification, [the Erie
doctrine] requires that state law govern substance and federal law govern procedure.").
30 Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949).
31 Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 107 (1945).
32 Id. at 109.
29

33

Id.
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[p]lainly enough, a statute that would completely bar
recovery in a suit if brought in a State court bears on a
State-created right vitally and not merely formally or
negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately
affect recovery or non-recovery of a federal court in a
34
diversity case should follow State law."
2. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. Then in a
1949 case, Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., the
Supreme Court decided whether state law or Rule 3 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure should determine when a suit commenced
to toll the statute of limitations. 3 5 Rule 3 states that "[a] civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." 36
However, in Kansas at the time, the state law required defendants
to receive service before an action was deemed to have
commenced.3 7 The plaintiff in the case filed his complaint in
Kansas federal court before the statute of limitations for his claim
ran. 38 However, he failed to perfect service until after the statute
of limitations had run, and the defendant moved to dismiss the
case because the action was not commenced under Kansas state
law before the statute of limitations had passed. 39 The Court in
Ragan based its reasoning off of that in York and held that state
law, rather than Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
should determine when an action is commenced in these situations
because "[i]f recovery could not be had in the state court, it should
be denied in the federal court. Otherwise, those authorized to

4 Id. at 110.
3 See Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531 ("Petitioner claimed that the filing of the complaint tolled
the statute [in accordance with Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]. Respondent
argued that by reason of a Kansas statute the statute of limitations was not tolled until
service of the summons.').
36 FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
37 See Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531 n.4 ("An action shall be deemed commenced within the
meaning of this article, as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served on
him, or on a codefendant who is a joint contractor, or otherwise united in interest with
him.... An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the commencement
thereof within the meaning of this article when the party faithfully, properly and diligently
endeavors to procure a service; but such attempt must be followed by... service of the
summons within sixty days." (quoting KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (1935))).
38 Id. at 531.
39 Id.
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invoke diversity jurisdiction would gain advantages over those
40
confined to state courts."
3. Hanna v. Plumer. The Court introduced a new approach to
the Erie analysis in its 1965 case, Hanna v. Plumer.41 In Hanna,
the Court had to determine whether to apply state law or Rule
4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine
whether the plaintiff had properly served process by leaving the
42
summons and complaint with a decedent's wife at his residence.
This violated Massachusetts law which required in-hand service
on an executor or administrator of an estate.43 It did not, however,
violate Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
allows individuals to leave copies of the summons and complaint
with a "person of suitable age" residing in the defendant's
"dwelling house or usual place of abode." 44 The lower district and
circuit courts both considered this rule substantive rather than
procedural under the holdings in Ragan and York, and therefore
held that state law should apply to determine the adequacy of
The Court rejected the plaintiffs
service in these cases. 45
4 6 which was summarized as:
argument,
(1) Erie, as refined in York, demands that federal
courts apply state law whenever application of federal
law in its stead will alter the outcome of the case. (2)
40

Id. at 532.

380 U.S. 460 (1965).
See id. at 461-62.
43 See id. at 462 ("Except as provided in this chapter, an executor or administrator shall not
be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which is not commenced within
one year from the time of his giving bond for the performance of his trust, or to such an action
which is commenced within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such
action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator or service
thereof accepted by him or a notice stating the name of the estate, the name and address of
the creditor, the amount of the claim and the court in which the action has been brought has
been filed in the proper registry of probate." (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 197 § 9 (1958)).
4 Id. at 461 (noting that service shall be made "[u]pon an individual other than an infant or
an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him
personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein" (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1))).
45 See id. at 462-63 (noting that the district court and First Circuit both found the
adequacy of service was to be measured by Massachusetts's rules rather than Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1)).
46 See id. at 466 ("The syllogism possesses an appealing simplicity, but is for several
reasons invalid.").
41

42
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In this case, a determination that the Massachusetts
service requirements obtain will result in immediate
victory for respondent. If, on the other hand, it should
be held that Rule 4(d)(1) is applicable, the litigation
will continue, with possible victory for the petitioner.
(3) Therefore, Erie demands application of the
Massachusetts rule. 47
First, the Court held that if a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
directly collides with the state rule, the Court must apply the
federal rule as long as it does not violate the Rules Enabling Act or
the Constitution.48 The Court held that the direct collision between
the state rule and Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, here, "is unavoidable; Rule 4(d)(1) says-implicitly, but
with unmistakable clarity-that inhand service is not required in
federal courts. '49 However, the Court did acknowledge that it has
ruled in previous cases, such as Ragan, "that the scope of the
Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and
therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in
dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law." 50 After the
Court decided that there was a direct collision, it held that Rule
4(d)(1) was constitutional "[fjor the constitutional provision for a
federal court system ... carries with it congressional power to make
rules governing the practice and pleadings in those courts." 51 The
Court noted that "Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the longrecognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for
federal courts even though some of those rules will inevitably differ
from comparable state rules."52
This Court also clarified that even if there was no controlling
federal rule on point, it is doubtful whether the Court would apply
the state rule because "nonsubstantial, or trivial" variations in
47 Id.
48 See id. at 471 ("When a situation is covered by one of the Federal
Rules, the question
facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court has
been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory
Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.').
49 Id. at 470.
1o Id. at 470 & n.12.
51 Id. at 472.
52 Id. at 473.
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federal and state rules, such as determining the adequacy of
service, are unlikely to meet the twin aims of Erie:
"discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws."53 The Court recognized that deciding
whether to apply the state or federal rule for service of process
would determine the outcome of the case "in the sense that if we
hold the state rule to apply, respondent prevails, whereas if we
54
hold that Rule 4(d)(1) governs, the litigation will continue."
However, the Court rejected this as the test of whether state law
55
It
should be considered substantive rather than procedural.
'outcomeis
variation
procedural
every
noted that "in this sense
determinative.' "56 The Court noted:
Erie and its progeny make clear that when a federal
court sitting in a diversity case is faced with a question
of whether or not to apply state law, the importance of
a state rule is indeed relevant, but only in the context
of asking whether application of the rule would make
so important a difference to the character or result of
the litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly
discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or
whether application of the rule would have so
important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of
likely to
the litigants that failure to enforce it would5 be
7
court.
federal
the
choose
to
plaintiff
a
cause
It also stated, "[w]hen, because the plaintiff happens to be a nonresident, such a right is enforceable in a federal as well as in a
State court, the forms and mode of enforcing the right may at
times, naturally enough, vary because the two judicial systems are
58
not identic."
4. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. In 1980, the Supreme Court
case, Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., revisited the Court's decision in
53 Id. at 466-68.
54 Id. at 468.

55 See id. at 468-69 (noting that the Court must look to the twin aims of Erie, rather than
the outcome-determinative test to determine whether to apply state or federal rules).
56 Id. at 468.
67 Id. at 468 n.9.
58 Id. at 473 (quoting Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945)).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss2/5

16

Boggs: How to Fill a Procedural Loophole: Re-Evaluating the Ragan and Wa

2018]

HOW TO FILL A PROCEDURAL LOOPHOLE

597

Ragan to apply state rules rather than Rule 3 when determining if
an action has commenced to toll a statute of limitations in light of
Hanna.59 Again, the plaintiff filed his complaint within the
statute of limitations, but did not perfect service until after the
limitations period had ended. 60 The Oklahoma state rule, like in
Ragan, did not deem an action commenced until service was
perfected. 61 Meanwhile Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure deems an action commenced upon filing the complaint. 62
The defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that the action
was barred by the state statute of limitations. 63 The Tenth Circuit
found that the Oklahoma rule was in direct conflict with Rule 3
when applying the Hanna analysis, but it nonetheless deferred to
state court rules because it felt constrained to follow Ragan since
the statutes at issue in both cases were "indistinguishable.64
The Court refused to hold that Hanna had overruled Ragan,
and it held that Ragan was still binding law on the Court. 65 The
Court noted that Hanna had distinguished Ragan because there
was no direct collision between Rule 3 and the state
commencement rule, thus the Court in Ragan did not need to
perform a Hanna analysis. 66 The Court ruled that "[tlhe first
69 446 U.S. 740, 741 (1980) ('This case presents the issue whether in a diversity action
the federal court should follow state law or, alternatively, Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in determining when an action is commenced for the purpose of tolling the
state statute of limitations.').
60 Id. at 742-43.
61 See id. at 743 n.4 ("An action shall be deemed commenced, within the meaning of this
article [the statute of limitations], as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which
is served on him, or on a codefendant, who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in
interest with him.... An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the
commencement thereof, within the meaning of this article, when the party faithfully,
properly and diligently endeavors to procure a service; but such attempt must be followed
by the first publication or service of the summons, . . . within sixty (60) days." (quoting
OKLA STAT. tit. 12 § 97 (1971))).
62 FED. R. CIV. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.').
63 Walker, 446 U.S. at 742.
64 Id. at 744 ('CThat court concluded that [the state rule] was 'in direct conflict' with Rule 3.
However, the Oklahoma statute was 'indistinguishable' from the statute involved in Ragan,
and the court felt itself 'constrained' to follow Ragan."(citations omitted)).
65 See id. at 749 ("A litigant who in effect asks us to reconsider not one but two prior
decisions bears a heavy burden of supporting such a change in our jurisprudence. Petitioner
here has not met that burden.').
66 See id. ("The Court in Hanna distinguished Ragan rather than overruled it, and for good
reason. Application of the Hanna analysis is premised on a 'direct collision' between the
Federal Rule and the state law." (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965))).
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question must therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule
in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court. It
is only if this question is answered affirmatively that the Hanna
analysis applies." 67 The Court cautioned, however, that
[t]his is not to suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to
avoid a "direct collision" with state law. The Federal
Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a direct
collision with state law arises from that plain
meaning, then the analysis developed in Hanna v.
68
Plumer applies.
The Court then determined that, like in Ragan, there was no
direct collision here between Rule 3 and the state commencement
rule.69 In so determining, the Court held:
[t]here is no indication that the Rule was intended to
toll a state statute of limitations, much less, that it
purported to displace state tolling rules for purposes of
state statutes of limitations. In our view, in diversity
actions Rule 3 governs the date from which various
timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin7 0to run,
but does not affect state statutes of limitations.
To support its view that there was no intention for Rule 3 to toll
the state statute of limitations, the Court looked at the language of
the statute, noting, "Rule 3 simply provides that an action is
commenced by filing the complaint and has as its primary purpose
the measuring of time periods that begin running from the date of
commencement; the rule does not state that filing tolls the statute
of limitations." 71 The Court also considered the original intent of
Rule 3. It noted Rule 3's Note of the Advisory Committee states:
67

Id. at 749-50.

68 Id. at 750 n.9.

69 See id. at 752 ("Since there is no direct conflict between the Federal Rule and the state
law, the Hannaanalysis does not apply.").
70 Id. at 750-51.
71 Id. at 750 n.10 (quoting 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1057 (1969)).
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[w]hen a Federal or State statute of limitations is
pleaded as a defense, a question may arise under this
rule whether the mere filing of the complaint stops the
running of the statute, or whether any further step is
required, such as, service of the summons and
complaint or their delivery to the marshal for service.
The answer to this question may depend on whether it
is competent for the Supreme Court, exercising the
power to make rules of procedure without affecting
substantive rights, to vary the operation of statutes of
limitations. The requirement of Rule 4(a) that the
clerk shall forthwith issue the summons and deliver it
to the marshal for service will reduce the chances of
72
such a question arising.
The Court stated:
[t]his Note establishes that the Advisory Committee
predicted the problem which arose in Ragan and arises
again in the instant case. It does not indicate,
however, that Rule 3 was intended to serve as a tolling
provision for statute of limitations purposes; it only
suggests that the Advisory Committee thought the
Rule might have that effect. 73
The Court then contrasted Rule 3's intent with the intent of the
state in enacting its rule. It stated, "[iun contrast to Rule 3, the
Oklahoma statute is a statement of a substantive decision by that
State that actual service on, and accordingly actual notice by, the
defendant is an integral part of the several policies served by the
statute of limitations." 74 The Court noted that requiring a
defendant be served furthers the purpose of the statute of
limitations by "establish[ing] a deadline after which the defendant
may legitimately have peace of mind" and allowing "defendant[s] to
attempt to piece together [their] defense[s]" in a relevant time

72

Id. (citation omitted).

73 Id.
74

Id. at 751.
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period. 75 The Court noted that "[i]t is these policy aspects which
make the service requirement an 'integral' part of the statute of
limitations both in this case and in Ragan. As such, the service rule
76
must be considered part and parcel of the statute of limitations."
Because there was no direct conflict, and thus the Court did not
need to apply a Hanna analysis, the Court evaluated the statute
under the unguided Erie analysis, looking to the twin aims of
Erie.77 The Court noted that the "failure to apply the state service
law might not create any problem of forum shopping"7 8 because:
[t]here is no indication that when petitioner filed his
suit in federal court he had any reason to believe that
he would be unable to comply with the service
requirements of Oklahoma law or that he chose to sue
in federal court in an attempt to avoid those service
79
requirements.
The Court did, however, rule that it would lead to inequitable
administration of the law.80 Thus the Court ruled that the state
81
rule applied.
5. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. Another
factor considered under the Erie analysis when a court decides a
state law does not directly collide with a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure was originally expressed in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc.8 2 In that case, the Court decided to apply
a federal rule, which allowed a jury to hear a claim, rather than a
state rule, which did not allow a certain issue to be determined by
a jury.8 3 The Court noted the state rule was not intended to be
"bound up" with an individual's substantive rights, but was rather
75 Id.

76 Id. at 751-52.
77 See id. at 752-53.

Id. at 753.
Id. at 753 n.15.
80 Id. at 753.
81 See id. ('The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.").
82 356 U.S. 525 (1958); see DONALD J. SAVERY, FRANK C. CoRSO &wnIIAM T. HARRINGTON,
46 MASS. PRAC., FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE § 8:2 (2d ed. 2016) (stating that Byrd "substantially
refined" the York rule).
83 See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538 ("We think that in the circumstances of this case the federal
court should not follow the state rule.").
78

79
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a form and mode of enforcing those rights.8 4 The Court then
indicated that a state rule interfering with an essential
characteristic or function of the federal system is not binding upon
85
the federal court.
6.
The Erie Test Today.
Following these cases, when
determining whether a federal court sitting in diversity should
apply state or federal law, it must first evaluate whether any
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or other federal positive law directly
collides with the state rule. If there is direct collision, the court
must defer to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or other positive
federal law as long as it does not violate the Rules Enabling Act or
the Constitution.8 6 Only after the court determines there is no
direct collision with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure may the court
then apply the unguided Erie analysis, asking whether applying the
federal rule would fail to meet the twin aims of Erie:
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws.8 7 Even if applying state law would meet
the unguided Erie analysis, a court can apply the Byrd test to
determine if the state rule is "bound up" with state substantive
rights and if applying the state rule would interfere with an
essential characteristic or function of the federal system. 8 8
B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN CAMBRIDGE

The Eleventh Circuit, in Cambridge, relied on Ragan and
Walker to determine that Georgia federal courts sitting in
84 Id.
at 535 ("We must, therefore, first examine the rule ... to determine whether it is
bound up with these rights and obligations in such a way that its application in the federal
court is required.").
85 See id. at 539 ("[S]tate statutes and constitutional provisions [can] not disrupt or alter
the essential character or function of a federal court.").
86 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) ("When a situation is covered by one of
the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively
unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can
refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their
prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.").
87 Id.
at 468; see also Walker v. Armco Steele Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980)
(evaluating the twin aims of Erie after noting that "[s]ince there is no direct conflict
between the Federal Rule and the state law, the Hanna analysis does not apply').
88 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535 ('We must, therefore, first examine the rule ... to determine
whether it is bound up with these rights and obligations in such a way that its application
in the federal court is required.").
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diversity must look to section 9-11-4(c) of the Georgia Code and its
five-day grace period rule in evaluating whether service was
timely perfected to relate back to the filing of the complaint.8 9
In applying this rule, the Eleventh Circuit looked at both
section 9-11-3 and section 9-11-4(c). 90 It noted that Georgia courts
have interpreted section 9-11-3(a) to require "service within a
reasonable time" following the filing of a complaint in order to
commence a civil action.9 1 Its parallel in federal court is codified in
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states "[a]
92
civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
Both of these statutes can be referred to as "commencement rules."
On the other hand, section § 9-11-4(c)(5) states, "[w]hen service
is to be made within this state, the person making such service
shall make the service within five days from the time of receiving
the summons and complaint; but failure to make service within
the five-day period will not invalidate a later service. '93 Its
parallel in federal court is now codified in Rule 4(m) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states "[i]f a defendant is not
served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the
court... must dismiss the action... or order that service be made
within a specified time."94 Both of these statutes can be referred to
as "timely service rules."
The Eleventh Circuit applied the Hanna analysis to determine
whether Georgia sections 9-11-3 and 9-11-4(c) directly collided with
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dictate when a suit
commences. 95 It found there was no direct collision between Rule 3
and section 9-11-3 by looking to the Court's analysis in Ragan and
Walker, which similarly found Rule 3 and state commencement
statutes did not directly collide. 96 The Eleventh Circuit then noted
that Walker reaffirmed Ragan's holding, quoting, "[t]here is no
indication that . . . Rule [3] was intended to toll a state statute of

89 Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Claxton, 720 F.2d 1230, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 1983).
90 See id. at 1233 (looking at sections 9-11-3 and 9-11-4 of the Georgia Code).
91 See id. (quoting Franek v. Ray, 236 S.E.2d 629, 632 (Ga. 1977)).
92

FED. R. Civ. P. 3.

93

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c)(5) (2017).

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
95 See Cambridge, 720 F.2d at 1232 (determining whether Rule 3 controls when a suit
9

commences).
96 Id. at 1232-33.
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limitations, much less that it purported to displace state tolling
rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations."9 7
The Eleventh Circuit applied this analysis, finding that Georgia
courts, "[b]y holding that service of process does not relate back to
toll the statute of limitations unless the plaintiff has acted
diligently," interpreted their commencement of action and timely
service statutes as "integral parts of the state statute of
limitations."98 It, therefore, found Georgia's commencement and
timely service statutes did not directly collide with Rule 3.99 Then,
it applied the unguided Erie analysis, quoting Walker, in stating:
[T]here is simply no reason why, in the absence of a
controlling federal rule, an action based on state law
which concededly would be barred in the state courts
by the state statute of limitations should proceed
through litigation to judgment in federal court solely
because of the fortuity that there is diversity of
citizenship between the litigants. 100
The Eleventh Circuit therefore found, "Georgia law determines
whether plaintiffs are barred by the statute of limitations."1 0 1
IV. WHY GEORGIA FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD APPLY FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(M) TO DETERMINE WHETHER SERVICE
OF PROCESS WAS TIMELY PERFECTED TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

The service of process at issue in Cambridge occurred before
1983-the year Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
amended to include a federal timely service requirement. 10 2
97 Id. at 1232 (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 (1980) (footnotes
omitted)).
98 Id. at 1233.
9 Id.
100 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 753).
101 Id.
102 Compare Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1983) (showing that the first amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that incorporated a timely service requirement were approved on January 12,
1983), with Cambridge, 720 F.2d at 1231 (stating that the plaintiffs served the defendant in
1982).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

23

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 [2018], Art. 5

604

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:581

Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit did not have the opportunity to
determine whether section 9-11-4(c)'s timely service requirement
directly collided with the one in Rule 4.103 The Eleventh Circuit's
analysis in Cambridge, as a result, is now incomplete because it
does not analyze the direct collision of these rules, which is the
first step in any Erie analysis. 10 4 Similarly, both Walker and
Ragan did not analyze the direct collision between Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the relevant state timely
service requirements because they were also decided before the
federal timely service rule was incorporated into the Federal Rules
10 5
of Civil Procedure.
Therefore, these decisions must be re-analyzed in light of Rule
4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether
direct collision exists. If the Eleventh Circuit re-analyzes its
decision in Cambridge,it should find that Rule 4(m) and Georgia's
timely service rule directly collide, and, therefore, the court should
defer to Rule 4(m)'s requirement. Even if the Eleventh Circuit
finds there is no direct collision, it should still defer to the federal
rule for timely service because applying the state rule would
violate the twin aims of Erie in light of the current procedural
loophole. Moreover, under the Byrd analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
should apply Rule 4(m) because Georgia's timely service rule is not
"bound up" in a substantive right and applying it would interfere
with an essential function of the federal system.
A. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(M) DIRECTLY COLLIDES
WITH THE GEORGIA STATE COURT RULE FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS

Because there is no Supreme Court precedent analyzing the
direct collision of Rule 4(m) and state timely service statutes, the
Eleventh Circuit can analyze the issue anew, employing the
103 Instead, it performed a Hanna analysis to see if Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 directly
collided with the commencement and timely service statutes, stating, "[i]f... Rule 3 [does not
directly collide], Georgia['s commencement and timely service statutes] ... determine whether
the action is barred by the statute of limitations." Cambridge, 720 F.2d at 1232.
04 See generally id. at 1230.
105 Compare Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1983) (showing that the first amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that incorporated a timely service requirement were approved on January 12,
1983), with Walker, 446 U.S. 740 (decided in 1980), and Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer &
Wavehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
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Court's reasoning in Hanna and Walker to inform its decision.
Here, like in Hanna and unlike in Walker, the direct collision
between state and federal timely service rules is unavoidable for
two reasons: (1) the scope of Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is sufficiently broad to control the question of whether
service was timely perfected as authorized by law based on its
plain language and original intent; and (2) the Eleventh Circuit
need not meet a heavy burden to overcome Supreme Court
precedent governing direct collision like in Walker.10 6
First, in light of Rule 4(m)'s plain language and original intent,
its scope is sufficiently broad to control questions regarding how
long a plaintiff has to perfect service of process upon a defendant
before his complaint is dismissed. The Federal Rule and state law
must be accorded their plain meaning to determine whether a
direct collision arises therefrom. 10 7
Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m) states that "[i]f a defendant is not served within 90
days after the complaint is filed, the court ...must dismiss the
action... or order that service be made within a specified time."10 8
In Henderson v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted
Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an
"irreducible allowance" rather than an outer limit that can be
reduced when read in conjunction with other timely service
statutes. 10 9 The Court noted that the "Federal Rules... convey a
clear message: Complaints are not to be dismissed if served within
[Rule 4's time limit] ... ."110 It rejected any allegation that a
statute shortening the timeframe in which service can be timely
perfected did not collide with Rule 4(m). 111 Therefore, the plain

106 See Walker, 446 U.S. at 749 ("A litigant who in effect asks us to reconsider not one but
two prior decisions bears a heavy burden of supporting such a change in our jurisprudence.!).
107 Id.
at 750 n.9.
108 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
109 Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 661 (1996).
110 Id. at 663.
111 Id. at 661-63. In Henderson, the Court determined that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, rather than a timely service requirement under the Suits in Admiralty Act,
governed the timing for service of process. See id. at 656 ("We hold that, in actions arising
under federal law, commenced in compliance with the governing statute of limitations, the
manner and timing of serving process are generally nonjurisdictional matters of 'procedure'
controlled by the Federal Rules.'). The Court rejected the United States' argument that
because the two timely service rules could be read harmoniously there was no direct
collision. See id. at 661-63 (rejecting the suggestion "that Rule 4's extendable 120-day time
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meaning of Rule 4(m) governs how long a plaintiff has to perfect
service of process before an action is dismissed.
Similarly, section 9-11-4(c) governs how long a plaintiff has to
perfect service before an action is dismissed. It states that service
should be made "within five days from the time of receiving the
summons and complaint," 112 and if this is not met, Georgia courts
have ruled that the timeline can be extended if a plaintiff
demonstrates he exercised due diligence in serving the summons
and complaint. 11 3 Georgia courts have employed section 9-11-4(c)
to determine whether service was timely "perfected as authorized
by law" in order to commence an action tolling a statute of
limitations, but, here again, the timely service rule only dictates
how long a plaintiff had to perfect service before his action should
1 1 5 section 9-11-4(c)
be dismissed. 11 4 Like the statute in Henderson,
often shortens the time frame in which service may be timely
perfected, and thus must be read to directly collide with Rule
4(m)'s irreducible allowance.
Additionally, a court may look to the original intent of the
11 6
federal and state rules to determine if they directly collide.
There is evidence that Congress intended Rule 4(m)'s timely
service requirement to aid in determining whether a suit has been
commenced to toll a statute of limitations. In an appendix to the
U.S. Code concerning Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Congress explicitly noted its intent that a court
determining whether a statute of limitations was tolled by timely
service should look to Rule 4's timely service requirement even if
prescription, and the Suits in Admiralty Act's service 'forthwith' instruction, can and should
be read harmoniously').
112 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c) (2017).
113 See Cantin v. Justice, 480 S.E.2d 250, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) ("Where a complaint is
filed near the statute of limitation and service is made after the statute expires and after
the five-day safe harbor provision contained within [O.C.G.A.] § 9-11-4(c), the relation back
of the service to the date of filing is dependent upon the diligence exercised by the plaintiff
in perfecting service .... 'The plaintiff has the burden of showing that due diligence was
exercised.'" (quoting Mann v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 452 S.E.2d 130, 132 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994))).
114 Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kilgore, 462 S.E.2d 713, 714 (Ga. 1995) (citing
Hilton v. Maddox, Bishop, Hayton Frame & Trim Contractors, Inc., 188 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1972)).
115 See supranote 111.
116 See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 (1980) (looking to the
Advisory Committee's notes to see whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure directly
collided with the intention of a state rule).
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the court applies the state's commencement rule. 117
This,
therefore, indicates the Rule was intended to govern whether
service was timely perfected to toll a statute of limitations.
Moreover, here, unlike in Walker, Georgia did not intend its
timely service statute to be an integral part of its substantive rules
governing its statutes of limitations. Georgia's rule governing the
tolling of a statute of limitations states, "[i]f the timely filing of [a
complaint] is followed by timely service perfected as authorized by
law, the subsequent service will relate back to the initial filing
even though the statute of limitations has run in the interim."118
In reciting this rule, the court emphasized that a party must
comply with Georgia's commencement statute, but it did not
specify which law to look to for the timely service requirement.
Georgia courts, therefore, indicated that they did not consider the
manner and timeliness of service to be an integral part of their
statute of limitations jurisprudence.
Thus, unlike the
commencement rule in Walker, Georgia's timely service rule is not
an integral part of the state's substantive law concerning its
statutes of limitations.
Second, the Eleventh Circuit will not have to surpass a heavy
burden to find direct collision here, unlike in Walker. The Court's
decision in Walker was premised on the fact that the Court already
decided in Ragan the exact same issue of whether a state
commencement statute or Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure controlled tolling of a statute of limitations, and
1 1 9 Because
Ragan's decision was confirmed in Hanna.
Ragan and
Hanna were still binding precedent governing the issue, the
petitioner in Walker bore a heavy burden if he wanted to change
the Court's jurisprudence.1 2 0 The Supreme Court held the burden
was not met.1 2 1 Here, unlike in Walker, there is no binding

117 See 28 U.S.C. app. at 530 (1982) ("If the law provides that the statute of limitation is
tolled by filing and service of the complaint, then a dismissal under [the Federal Rule] for
failure to serve within the 120 days would, by the terms of the law controlling the tolling,
bar the plaintiff from later maintaining the cause of action.").
118 Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 S.E.2d at 714 (emphasis added) (citing Hilton v.
Maddox, Bishop, Hayton Frame & Trim Contractors, Inc., 188 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972)).

119 Walker, 446 U.S. at 749.

See id. (noting that a litigant asking the Court to reconsider two prior decisions bears a
heavy burden).
120

121

Id.
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Supreme Court precedent stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(m), which governs timely service of process, is not sufficiently
broad to control the question of whether service was timely
perfected as authorized by law. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit is
less restricted in deciding the collision issue.
Courts are not supposed to narrowly construe Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in order to avoid a "direct collision" with state
law. 122 Because the plain meaning and original intent of the
federal and state timely service rules indicate they directly collide,
and because the Eleventh Circuit need not overcome Supreme
Court precedent governing the collision of these rules, the
Eleventh Circuit should find that Georgia's timely service
requirement directly collides with Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it should defer to the Federal Rule
as long as it is constitutional and consistent with the Rules
Enabling Act. 123
It is true that many courts determining whether to apply Rule
4(m) or a state timely service rule have found no direct collision
when the rule is tied to a statute of limitations. 124 However, as one
court noted, many of these cases erroneously appeal to the twin
aims of Erie without first evaluating whether Rule 4(m) directly
collides under the Hanna analysis. Many also overlook the fact
that Walker was decided before Rule 4's timely service
requirements were enacted and thus overly rely on the case's
holding. 125 Additionally, one court noted that all courts deciding
whether Rule 4 governs when service is independent of a statute of
Id. at 750 n.9.
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) ("When a situation is covered by one of
the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively
unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can
refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their
prima facie judgement that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.').
124 See, e.g., Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35, 42 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating in dicta
that an argument that Rule 4(m) collides is dubious considering Walker); Wm.H. McGee &
Co. v. Liebherr Am., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 861, 866 (E.D. Ky. 1992) (noting that finding a direct
collision with Rule 4(m) is directly contrary to Walker); Poulos v. Wilson, 116 F.R.D. 326,
330 (D. Vt. 1987) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that Rule 4 applied instead of state law
relying in part on Walker); Robinette v. Johnston, 637 F. Supp. 922, 925 (M.D. Ga. 1986)
(looking to Walker to determine that state rather than federal law applied).
125 See Tillman v. Georgia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1319 (S.D. Ga. 2006) (explaining the
defects in previous cases deciding whether Rule 4(m) governs).
122

123
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limitations have found state timely service requirements do
directly collide with Rule 4(m), indicating "courts thus far have
decided whether the rules collide based not on the content of the
rules, but the consequences of breaking them." 126 Analyzing direct
collision based upon the consequences of breaking a rule is
contrary to the test specified in Walker for direct collision, which
stated that "[i]f a direct collision with state law arises from [the]
plain meaning [of a Federal Rule], then the analysis developed in
127
Hanna v. Plumer applies."
B. EVEN IF RULE 4(M) DOES NOT DIRECTLY COLLIDE WITH THE
GEORGIA COURT RULE, IT VIOLATES THE TWIN AIMS OF ERIE TO
APPLY THE STATE RULE

When evaluating the twin aims of Erie, the Court in Hanna
evaluated whether applying a different rule in federal and state
court would discourage forum-shopping and avoid inequitable
administration of the laws. 128 The primary determination in this
analysis is whether the application of the rule would make such a
grave difference in the result of the litigation "that failure to
enforce [the rule] would unfairly discriminate against citizens of
the forum State, or whether application of the rule would have so
important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants
that failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to
129
choose the federal court."'
Here, unlike many cases where applying a federal rule risks
encouraging forum-shopping and inequitable administration of the
law, 130 applying the state timely service rule in Georgia federal
126 See id. at 1321-22. Every court that has evaluated whether Rule 4(m) directly collides
with a state timely service requirement where the. service of process was independent of a
statute of limitations tolling issue has found direct collision. Spung v. Fairwinds Fin.
Servs., 2006 WL 2048291, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2006) (unpublished), Melvin v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 622, 625 (M.D. N.C. 2004), Mills v. Curioni, Inc., 238 F.
Supp. 2d 876, 885 (E.D. Mich. 2002), Hart v. Bates, 897 F. Supp. 710, 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
127 446 U.S. at 750 n.9.
128 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-68 ('The outcome-determination test therefore cannot be read
without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of law.").
129 Id. at 468 n.9.
130 See id. at 466-68 ('The question is... does it significantly affect the result of a
litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a state that would be controlling in an
action upon the same claim by the same parties in a state court?" (quoting Guaranty Trust
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courts poses these risks. Application of the Georgia timely service

rule in federal court creates the procedural loophole previously
discussed that theoretically eliminates a plaintiffs need to comply
with state statute of limitations rules. 131 Without a statute of
limitations cutting off the time in which a plaintiff can bring a
claim, defendants in Georgia federal courts might not receive fair
notice of an adverse claim, potentially leading to spoliation of
evidence, a constant fear of claims arising out of actions long past,
and fraudulent or harassing suits.132 However, defendants in
Georgia state courts would not face this risk because the
of limitations void only
procedural loophole rendering statutes
133
exists within Georgia federal courts.
This is the kind of grave disparity in results the twin aims of
Erie sought to avoid. 134 Failure to enforce Rule 4's timely service
requirement in federal courts would unfairly discriminate against
Georgia defendants by denying some citizens the benefits
associated with statutes of limitations. Also, applying Georgia's
timely service requirements in federal courts would have so
significant an effect upon the fortune of a plaintiff who could take
advantage of the loophole to the detriment of the defendant that it
will likely cause the plaintiff to choose to bring a claim in federal
court. Therefore, applying the federal rule in these cases supports
the twin aims of Erie.

of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945))); Walker, 446 U.S. at 753 ("It issufficient to note
that although in this case failure to apply the state service law, [and instead applying
federal law] might not create any problem of forum shopping, the result would be an
inequitable administration of the law." (citations and quotations omitted)).
131 See discussion supra Part II.
132 See discussion supra Part I.
133 See discussion supra Part II.
13 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9 ("[T]he importance of a state rule is indeed relevant,
but only in the context of asking whether application of the rule would make so important a
difference to the character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly
discriminate against citizens of the forum state, or whether application of the rule would
have so important an effect would the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to
enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.").

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss2/5

30

Boggs: How to Fill a Procedural Loophole: Re-Evaluating the Ragan and Wa

2018]

HOW TO FILL A PROCEDURAL LOOPHOLE

611

C. ALTERNATIVELY, GEORGIA'S TIMELY SERVICE REQUIREMENT IS
NOT BOUND UP IN SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND ITS APPLICATION
WOULD INTERFERE WITH AN ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM

Even if applying the Georgia timely service rule would not
violate the twin aims of Erie, it would fail the Byrd test because:
(1) Georgia utilizes its timely service rule only as a form of
enforcing state substantive rights and the rule is not "bound up"
with any of these rights; and (2) application of the rule disrupts an
essential function of the federal system. 135
As previously mentioned, Georgia courts likely did not intend
the Georgia timely service rule to be an integral part of its
substantive rules governing the tolling of statutes of limitations.136
The substantive statute of limitations rule states, "[i]f the timely
filing of [a complaint] is followed by timely service perfected as
authorized by law, the subsequent service will relate back to the
initial filing even though the statute of limitations has run in the
interim.1 37 Because this rule does not specify which law should be
applied in order to determine whether service was timely perfected
"as authorized by law," the Georgia courts likely did
not view
Georgia's timely service requirement as being bound up with
individuals' substantive rights under this rule.
Additionally, applying Georgia's timely service rule disrupts an
essential function of federal courts-ensuring defendants receive
timely service of a summons and complaint. Rule 4's timely
service requirement was enacted in conjunction with another
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which shifted
the responsibility of perfecting service of a summons and
complaint from marshals to plaintiffs. 138 The Supreme Court has
previously noted that Rule 4's timely service requirement
133See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536, 539.(1958) (noting
that a state rule that is not bound up in an individual's substantive rights and that disrupts
or alters an essential character or function of a federal court should not be applied in
federal courts).
136 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
137 Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kilgore, 462 S.E.2d 713, 714 (Ga. 1995) (emphasis
added) (citing Hilton v. Maddox, Bishop, Hayton Frame & Trim Contractors, Inc., 188
S.E.2d 167, 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972)).
138 See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 662 (1996) ("Rule 4 changes made
operative in 1983 completed a shift in responsibility for service from the United States
marshals to the plaintiff.").
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originated because "[w]ith marshals no longer available as routine
process servers, the Judicial Conference considered a time control
necessary." 139 Therefore, Rule 4(m) was established in conjunction
with Rule 4(b) which places responsibility for perfecting service on
the plaintiff. 140 These rules, together, serve the federal court's
essential functions of providing defendants adequate notice of an
adverse claim and an opportunity to be heard as required by the
141
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Both rules are needed to appropriately enact the federal scheme.
Applying Georgia's timely service requirement instead of Rule
4(m) disrupts this scheme by disaggregating these two rules.
Because of this, the Eleventh Circuit and Georgia federal courts
sitting in diversity should apply Federal Rule 4(m) rather than
Georgia's timely service requirement.
V. CONCLUSION

It is only a matter of time until a plaintiff attempts to take
advantage of the Georgia procedural loophole to serve his needs to
the detriment of his opposing party. To avoid this, the Eleventh
Circuit should take swift action to close the loophole by reevaluating its decision in Cambridge and allowing Georgia federal
courts to apply Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
govern its highly procedural service of process scheme. Until the
procedural loophole is filled, individuals remain vulnerable and
may suffer the same fate as Barbara and Alex, unexpectedly losing
everything due to an inaccurate verdict. Now is the time to act.

139 Id.

140 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(b) ("If the summons is properly completed, the clerk must sign,
seal, and issue it to the plaintiff for service on the defendant." (emphasis added)).
141See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (noting that the
Due Process Clause means "deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication [must] be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case').
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